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COMMENT
FROM STEREOTYPES TO SOLID
GROUND: REFRAMING THE EQUAL
PROTECTION INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY STANDARD AND ITS
APPLICATION TO GENDER-BASED
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS POLICIES
INTRODUCTION
In response to an increasingly female student population on
campuses across the country, many undergraduate admissions
committees at both public and private institutions now give
preference to male applicants.1 Despite the apparent conflict between
such policies and the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,2
few have generated full-blown legal challenges.3 Aside from the
difficulties associated with proving gender-based discrimination,
perhaps one reason for the absence of equal-protection claims is the
somewhat murky state of the law on gender-based discrimination
1 See generally, Charlotte Allen, The Quiet Preference for Men in Admissions, MINDING
CAMPUS, (June 7, 2010), http://www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/2010/06/the_quiet_
preference_for_men.html; Jennifer Delahunty Britz, Op-Ed., To All the Girls I’ve Rejected,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006; Daniel DeVise, Sex Bias Probe in Colleges’ Selections, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 2009, at B1; Alex Kingsbury, Admittedly Unequal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 25, 2007, at 50.
2 Since 1971, the United States Supreme Court has held gender-based discrimination to a
heightened standard of review under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (finding Idaho’s objective in administrative convenience
insufficient to justify gender discrimination). Since that turning point, the Court has not upheld
the constitutionality of any law that facially discriminates against women.
3 Tellingly, the plaintiffs in the one challenge to reach the federal court system thus far
brought the claim only under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (reviewing plaintiffs’ claims
that the University of Georgia’s gender and racial preferences in admissions violated Title’s VI
and IX of the Civil Rights Act), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). The Johnson court found
Georgia’s gender preference policy unconstitutional, and noted that the “desire to help out
men . . . is far from persuasive.” Id. at 1376 n.10 (quotations omitted).
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under the Equal Protection Clause. While it is generally accepted that
gender-based classifications must be evaluated under intermediate
scrutiny, the Supreme Court’s precedent provides lower courts with
little guidance in applying that standard.4
Part of the reason for this confusion lies in the dominant role the
concept of “stereotype” plays in the Court’s intermediate scrutiny
analysis. As this Comment illustrates, the Court has articulated its
intermediate scrutiny standard in a way that makes “stereotype,” a
concept that remains ill-defined in the Court’s jurisprudence, the
deciding factor in its analysis.5 While the Court has succeeded in
articulating a relatively manageable intermediate scrutiny test in the
First Amendment context for commercial speech,6 its focus on
stereotype has impeded its ability to do the same in the context of
equal protection. This leaves lower courts and litigants seeking to
defend or challenge gender-based classifications with little guidance
on how to address questions that often prove critical in the equalprotection intermediate scrutiny analysis.
This Comment demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s equalprotection jurisprudence is in fact less muddled than it initially
appears. Rather, the Court’s equal-protection intermediate scrutiny
decisions reflect a reasoned application of the very same principles
the Court articulates in the First Amendment intermediate scrutiny
context, where the judicial discourse has not been dominated by the
unmanageable concept of gender group “stereotypes.” Thus,
reframing the equal-protection intermediate scrutiny analysis in a way
that corresponds to its First Amendment counterpart would be entirely
consistent with the Court’s prior precedent. Moreover, an
understanding of the parallels between the two analyses explains
away some of the perceived inconsistencies in the Court’s equalprotection jurisprudence.
Part I briefly discusses the evolution and operation of genderbased admissions policies in higher education. Part II illustrates the
development of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, including
4 See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center American Civil Liberties
Union, et al., in Support of Petitioner at 6–7, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(No. 94-1941), 1995 WL 703392 at *6–7 (“There is serious confusion among the lower courts
regarding the application of intermediate scrutiny to governmental classifications based on
sex.”).
5 See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449–50 (2000)
(discussing how stereotype factors into the Court’s analysis).
6 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) (discussing the standard by which courts should review commercial speech regulations).
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the “anti-stereotyping principle” that dominates the Court’s
intermediate scrutiny analysis, and the problems associated with such
reliance on “stereotypes” in judicial decision making. Part III
demonstrates how the Court’s focus on stereotypes has prevented it
from fully articulating the analysis it has employed in cases
addressing gender discrimination, and why the Court often seems to
contradict itself from one case to the next. Parts IV illustrates the
parallels between the Court’s First Amendment and equal-protection
intermediate scrutiny analyses, and demonstrate how viewing equalprotection intermediate scrutiny through the lens of First Amendment
intermediate scrutiny explains many of the points of confusion and
perceived inconsistencies in the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence. Part V discusses how courts and litigants addressing a
challenge to a gender-based admissions policies can use the Central
Hudson factors to frame their arguments and conduct their analysis in
a way that both clarifies the law and ensures that the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection does not play second fiddle to changing
societal perceptions.
I. GENDER-BASED ADMISSIONS POLICIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Over the past four decades, women’s enrollment in higher
education has increased at rapid-fire rates. In 1980, approximately
50% of college students were female.7 That percentage rose to 57%
by 2006, and is expected to continue rising past 60%.8 This increase
reflects social trends that have been building for some time.
According to observers of the educational system: young women are
outperforming their male counterparts in terms of academic
achievement.9 At first glance, this increase in women’s academic
achievement and resulting increase in female admissions rates would
be cause for celebration. But many university administrators fear that
an increasingly high percentage of female students will negatively
impact the ability of a university to attract applicants, which in turn

Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 50, 51.
Id.
9 See generally Michelle Conlin, The NEW Gender Gap: From Kindergarten to Grad
School, Boys Are Becoming the Second Sex, BUS. WK., May 26, 2003, at 75 (discussing the
differing achievement levels of men and women); Michael Gurian, Disappearing Act: Where
Have the Men Gone? No Place Good, The WASH. POST, December 4, 2005, at B1 (discussing
the trouble colleges have attracting and educating men); Tamar Lewin, At Colleges, Women Are
Leaving Men in the Dust, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at A1 (“[M]en . . . are less likely than
women to get bachelor’s degrees – and among those who do, fewer complete their degrees in
four or five years.”).
7
8
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will negatively affect a university’s prestige.10 The rationale for this
belief is two-fold. On one hand, university admissions directors fear
that males who perceive schools with a predominantly female
population as “girls’ schools,” will be deterred from applying.11
Conversely, school administrators fear that female applicants will be
deterred by the lack of opportunities to interact with members of the
opposite sex.12
Additionally, observers believe that the problems associated with
an increasingly “female” student body go beyond a decline in prestige
and university ranking. As editorialist Richard Whitmire observed
when interviewing students at James Madison University—a school
with 61% female population—gender imbalance can facilitate what
has been described as a “hookup culture” on campus.13 College
students report that in an environment where males are in the
minority, women compete to attract male attention, while males take
advantage of their “in demand” status, and in some cases even
become sexual predators.14 Thus, many university admissions officers
across the country must decide between continuing to admit only the
most qualified applicants, and risk the dangers associated with an
unbalanced student body, or taking affirmative steps to ensure that an
equal number of males and females are admitted.
At University of North Carolina’s Chapel Hill campus, for
instance, trustees became alarmed upon learning that the school’s
incoming freshman class was comprised of 58% women, and
suggested that the university create an “affirmative action” policy for
male applicants.15 The Board of Trustees at the University of
Richmond instructed the admissions office to keep the male-female
ratio at or below 45/55, according to a senior associate director of

10 See Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing the desire of university administrators to
admit roughly equal numbers of men and women); see also Britz, supra note 1, at A25 (noting
that the unfortunate consequence of admitting more women is a drop in the total number of
applicants).
11 See Britz, supra note 1 (noting that fewer males find a campus that has more than 60%
women attractive).
12 See Ernest Holsendolph, Grappling with the Gender Disparity Issue, DIVERSE: ISSUES
HIGHER EDUC., June 1, 2006, at 12 (“[S]tudents may prefer to attend schools where they’ll have
more opportunities to interact with the opposite sex.”); Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 52 (noting a
discussion with a sophomore female at the College of William and Mary in which the student
joked about the shortage of men to take to dances).
13 Richard Whitmire, A Tough Time to Be a Girl: Gender Imbalance on College
Campuses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 25, 2008, at A23.
14 See id. (discussing how males take advantage of the competition and sometimes the
result is abuse).
15 Allen, supra note 1.
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admissions at that school.16 The University of Georgia went one step
further, implementing an affirmative action policy that awarded
additional points to male applicants.17 Regardless of the specific
methods utilized by schools instituting these policies, the results have
become clear: universities are denying admission to female applicants
in favor of less qualified males.18
In 2009, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights launched an
investigation of 19 public and private institutions of higher education
across the country.19 The investigation aimed to determine the extent
to which the named colleges and universities preferred male
applicants in their admissions processes.20 As the Commission can
only make referrals and recommendations based on its findings, no
legal consequences will flow directly from the Commission’s
investigation.21 Nevertheless, a very real possibility exists that public
universities found to discriminate on the basis of gender in their
admissions policies will face potential lawsuits under the Equal
Protection Clause.22
II. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AND THE
ANTISTEREOTYPING PRINCIPLE
In cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court applies different levels of
judicial scrutiny depending on the nature of the classification at
issue.23 For a number of years, the Court only applied two levels of
scrutiny: strict scrutiny and rational basis review. Under strict
16 See Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 50 (discussing the University of Richmond’s
admissions policy).
17 See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365
(S.D. Ga. 2000) (noting that the University of Georgia provided males .25 of the requisite 4.92
“total student index” points to gain admission), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
18 See Britz, supra note 1, for the Dean of Admissions at Kenyon College’s discussion of
this unfortunate truth.
19 See Allen, supra note 1 (noting that the U.S. Civil Rights Commission launched an
investigation “into the extent of male preferences in admissions decisions at 19 various
institutions of higher learning”); DeVise, supra note 1, at B1 (discussing the Civil Rights
commission’s probe).
20 See Allen, supra note 1 (discussing the investigation).
21 See DeVise, supra note 1, at B2 (noting that the commission has no authority to enforce
complaints but can refer them to other agencies or recommend changes to federal law).
22 While gender discrimination may also give rise to legal proceedings under Title IX of
the Civil Rights Act and state antidiscrimination statutes, a discussion of those remedies falls
outside the scope of this Comment.
23 See Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States
v. Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1172–73
(1998) (discussing the differing levels of scrutiny for equal protection challenges).
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scrutiny, which the Court traditionally applied to classifications based
on race, the classification must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a
“compelling governmental interest.”24 The Court applies rationalbasis review to all other classifications, requiring only a rational
relationship between the classification and a legitimate government
interest.25
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court had never struck down instances
of discrimination on the basis of gender.26 As the movement for
women’s rights gained speed, however, the Court began to recognize
gender as a protected class. For several years, the Court equivocated
over the proper level of scrutiny to apply in gender-discrimination
cases. In Reed v. Reed,27 the Court’s first decision striking down a
gender-based classification, the Court applied rational-basis review to
strike down a state statute granting preference to males as estate
executors.28 Several years later, the Court took the opposite approach
in Frontiero v. Richardson,29 striking down a gender-based policy
under strict scrutiny.30
Finally, in Craig v. Boren,31 the Court announced a new,
intermediate scrutiny standard.32 The Court reasoned that intermediate
scrutiny is more appropriate than strict scrutiny for gender-based
classifications because differences between men and women may in
some circumstances justify different treatment.33 Unlike strict
scrutiny, which recognizes that there are almost never “inherent
differences” between different races to justify differential treatment,34
24 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 508 (2005); see also Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that courts must subject racially discriminatory laws to the
“most rigid scrutiny”).
25 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting
that the “general rule” is that legislation must be “rationally related to a legitimate state
interest”).
26 See Skaggs, supra note 23, at 1172 (noting that until 1971 gender based classification
were reviewed under a rational basis).
27 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
28 Id. at 76.
29 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
30 Id. at 689–90.
31 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
32
See id. at 197 (holding that “previous cases establish that classification by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives”).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (discussing the
allowable bases for gender classifications).
34 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (internal quotations
and citation omitted) (“It follows from that principle that all governmental action based on
race—a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to
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the more lenient intermediate scrutiny standard leaves room for states
to classify individuals based on gender when legitimate differences
between the genders make it necessary to do so.35 Intended to serve as
a middle ground between strict scrutiny and rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny requires that government demonstrate that a
gender classification serves important government interests, and that
the classification is substantially related to the achievement of those
interests.36 In its more recent jurisprudence, the Court announced that
to survive this degree of scrutiny, proponents of a gender
classification must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive”
justification for a policy that discriminates on the basis of gender.37
A. Stereotype in Intermediate Scrutiny
While the Court repeatedly recited the test for intermediate
scrutiny as including an interest and tailoring component, these
articulated components of intermediate scrutiny are rarely the
deciding factors in a Supreme Court gender discrimination decision.38
Rather, the Court’s inquiry focuses almost exclusively on whether the
policy at issue reinforces a stereotype, or an overbroad generalization
about men and women.39 Although not all of the Court’s decisions use
the term “stereotype,” the word is a term of art among commentators,
referring to any number of overbroad, archaic, or irrational
generalizations the Court finds insufficient to justify gender-based
classifications.40
For instance, in analyzing whether a governmental interest is
sufficiently “important” to justify a gender classification, the Court
rejects as “illegitimate” any interest that reflects “archaic and

equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
35 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (“A classification ‘must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”
(quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))).
36 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
37 Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
38 See Case, supra note 5, at 1449 (noting that the interest and tailoring prongs of
intermediate scrutiny “have rarely been the moving parts” in the Court’s analysis of gender
discrimination claims).
39 See id. (noting that if a governmental action distinguishes between men and women the
only remaining question is “[d]oes the sex-respecting rule rely on a stereotype?”).
40 See, e.g., id. (noting that “‘stereotype’ has become a term of art”); see also infra Part
II.B (discussing the Court’s various articulations of this concept).
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stereotypic notions” about members of a gender group.41 The Court
also uses the concept of stereotype in analyzing whether a genderclassification is substantially tailored to achieve that interest. The
Court has expressly noted that the purpose of the “substantial
relationship” requirement “is to assure that the validity of a
classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than
through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate,
assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.”42
When framed in this manner, the tailoring prong of intermediate
scrutiny turns on the concept of stereotype just as much as the
substantial-interest prong. In this respect, the Court’s intermediate
scrutiny jurisprudence embodies what commentators have called the
“anti-stereotyping principle.”43 This focus on stereotype differentiates
intermediate scrutiny from the other levels of judicial scrutiny that
center more heavily on the nature of the interest to be served, and the
connection between that interest and the means selected to achieve it.
While this lack of jurisprudential cohesion may not in and of itself
pose a problem, the Court’s reliance on “stereotype” presents
difficulties for lower courts because the Court has failed to fully
articulate exactly what “stereotype” means. Moreover, the Court has
failed to account for the possibility that stereotypes vary from one
generation to the next, such that ideas about men and women that are
readily accepted as true today could become tomorrow’s “archaic”
and “outmoded” generalizations.
B. Stereotype Is Ill-defined and Creates Difficulty for Lower Courts
Perhaps the most obvious problem inherent in the Court’s reliance
on stereotypes to evaluate gender-based classifications lies in its
failure to clearly define a term that plays such an important role in its
analysis. In many of its early gender discrimination cases, the Court
indicated that stereotypes are those generalizations that are
“outmoded” or “archaic.”44 The Court also made clear that
41 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (noting that the
“statutory objective” cannot reflect “archaic and stereotypic notions” (citing Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (plurality opinion))).
42 Id. at 725–26.
43 See generally Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 88 (2010) (discussing the anti-stereotyping
principle).
44 See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975) (holding that a statute that provided
that females reach age of majority at 18 and that males reach age of majority at 21 could not
survive equal-protection analysis because it merely relied on “old notions” regarding the sexes);
see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (framing “stereotypes” as
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“outmoded” ideas are those suggesting that the “proper place” of
women is in the home and that women need “special protection.”45
More recently, the Court characterized as “stereotypes” those
assumptions that are unrelated to inherent differences between males
and females.46 Similarly, the Court has framed “different physical
needs of men and women” as the opposite of stereotype,47 indicating
that any classification based on physical differences would not offend
the equal protection clause under intermediate scrutiny. While this
definition could offer an objective basis for distinguishing permissible
from impermissible assumptions, the Court has never articulated the
boundaries of the concept of “inherent” or “physical” differences. As
Part IV illustrates, while the only “inherent” differences the Court has
recognized are those related to reproduction; still, the Court has never
expressly limited the concept to only reproductive differences.
In United States v. Virginia,48 the Court used perhaps the broadest
definition of stereotype when it referred to “overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and
females.”49 The Court then narrowed its definition in Tuan Anh
Nguyen v. I.N.S.,50 defining stereotype as the “frame of mind resulting
from irrational or uncritical analysis.”51 This provides the narrowest
definition articulated thus far; in fact, under the Nguyen standard,
virtually any classification that is “rational” would pass constitutional
muster. Notably, however, the Court has not used this definition of
stereotype since its decision in Nguyen, and has since returned to the
broad definition articulated in Virginia.52

archaic and outdated misconceptions concerning role of women in home or work); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985) (referring to “outmoded
notions” concerning women’s capabilities); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (noting
that “‘old notions’ of role typing” were not valid governmental classifications).
45 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279–80 (1979) (striking down a statute providing
alimony only to women because the state relied impermissibly on an assumption that women
play a “dependent role” in the “allocation of family responsibilities”). Similarly, the Court in
Craig v. Boren expressed concern for “outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females
in the home rather than in the marketplace and world of ideas.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 198–99
(quotation marks omitted).
46 Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (referring to “assumptions
about . . . men and women that are unrelated to any inherent differences between the sexes”);
Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733 n.6 (2003) (discussing the “different
physical needs of men and women”).
47 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733 n.6 (2003).
48 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
49 Id. at 533.
50
533 U.S. 53 (2000).
51 Id. at 68.
52 See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729 (“The State’s justification for such a classification
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C. Stereotypes Change from Generation to Generation
While the Court’s failure to define “stereotype” in a consistent
manner creates obvious problems for litigants and lower courts
seeking guidance, the more fundamental problem lies in the
possibility that an important constitutional question, such as the
permissibility of a gender-based policy, could turn on a transient
concept that varies from one generation to the next. As Justice Scalia
observed in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,53 “times and trends do
change,”54 such that the constitutionality of a gender classification
may depend solely on “the current generation’s conclusion that a
politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens on the
basis of [gender] is reasonable.”55
A review of the Court’s decisions demonstrates how one era’s
accepted truths may easily become another era’s “stereotype.” For
instance, in an 1872 decision upholding a statute banning women
from being admitted to the legal profession, three concurring justices
relied heavily on the “wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman.”56 These justices also noted that “[t]he
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother.”57 In upholding a statute that
prohibited women from working as bartenders, the Court accepted the
government’s contention that it needed to protect women from the
“moral dangers” associated with the liquor industry.58 But a mere
three decades after its decision in Goesart, a plurality of the Court
rejected these ideas as “romantic paternalism,” which “put women,
not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”59 As these decisions demonstrate,
the line between accepted truths and “stereotypes” about genders can
shift dramatically over a short period time.

‘must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences
of males and females.’” (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533)).
53 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
54 Id. at 158 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting),
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
56 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
57 Id.
58 Goesart v. Cleary, 355 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (“Since bartending by women may, in the
allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may
devise preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if it
believes that as to a defined group of females other factors are operating which either eliminate
or reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition.”).
59 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Additionally, the Justice Powell cautioned against “hitching the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to . . . transitory
considerations.”60 While the “transitory considerations” Justice
Powell spoke of in Bakke referred to the minority or majority position
of various racial groups within society, the same principle applies to
beliefs about the position of men and women in society. Like a
particular racial group’s minority or majority status, the concept of a
gender stereotype is subject to “shifting political and social
judgments.”61 Because the Court has acknowledged many gender
stereotypes reflect “archaic” ideas about the proper roles of men and
women, it follows that present-day “stereotypes” were once wellaccepted truths that could be invoked to justify gender-based
discrimination.62
The Bakke Court cautioned that such “mutability of a
constitutional principle” undermines the Court’s ability to “discern
‘principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the
community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift
them above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of a
particular time and place.’”63 It remains a very real possibility that
while some gender-based classifications, particularly those designed
to compensate members of one gender group,64 may be permissible at
one time, the same classifications could be rendered impermissible in
the future, particularly once gender “preferences beg[i]n to have their
desired effect.”65 This creates a problem for courts looking for
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
Id. at 299.
62 Commentators have even suggested that individual judges’ “personal perceptions of the
reasonableness of allocating rights by gender” have influenced the Court’s decisions. 4 RONALD
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.23(k) (4th ed. 2007); see also E.A. Hull, Sex Discrimination and the Equal
Protection Clause: An Analysis of Kahn v. Shevin and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639,
671 (1979) (“Unlike the lenient rational relationship, or the rigorous strict scrutiny test, the
middle-tier has no predictable application. Whether or not a given classification furthers an
‘important governmental interest,’ or is ‘substantially related’ to this interest, are subjective
determinations, and a conservative majority is as likely to conclude one way as a liberal
majority is to conclude the other.”); John K. Vincent, Note, Equal Protection and the “MiddleTier”: The Impact on Women and Illegitimates, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303, 321 (1978)
(noting the highly subjective nature of the inquiry and “the confusion and inconsistency
generated” by the intermediate scrutiny standard).
63 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (quoting A. COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)).
64 See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (analyzing a provision allowing
women to deduct low-income years for purposes of calculating social security retirement
benefits); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (analyzing a statute providing property tax
exemption to women).
65 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297.
60
61

3/1/2011 5:33:26 PM

1422

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

guidance in the Supreme Court’s early intermediate scrutiny
jurisprudence; while certain assumptions about women may have
reflected a well-documented truth in 1971, they may today reinforce
“archaic notions” about males and females. Similarly, ideas about
males and females unheard of forty years ago (for instance, the idea
that males are less likely to achieve academically than their female
counterparts) may now turn the concept of “stereotype” on its head.66
III. PERCEIVED “UNWORKABILITY”67 OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
In addition to the problems with relying on an ill-defined and everchanging concept to decide constitutional questions, the Court’s focus
on stereotype in the equal-protection context has infringed on its
ability to fully articulate the analysis it has conducted in evaluating
whether a gender classification is sufficiently tailored to the asserted
interest. As amici in United States v. Virginia, the National Women’s
Law Center and the ACLU noted that lower courts have experienced
“great difficulty” in evaluating whether the means and ends are
“substantially related.”68 In fact, lower courts have complained that,
because the Supreme Court’s intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence is
“indeterminate,”69 and fraught with “problems,”70 it fails to provide
lower courts with sufficient guidance for evaluating gender-based
discrimination.71 Members of the Court themselves have even noted
the potential problems with intermediate scrutiny poses for lower
courts and litigants attempting to defend or challenge gender-based
classifications. 72
66 See Gurian, supra note 9 (describing documented trends of academic underachievement
among boys and young men). While such trends do not reflect traditional “stereotypes,” it does
open the door for a new type of “overbroad generalization” that may in the future put males as a
group at a disadvantage.
67 See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center American Civil Liberties
Union, et al., in Support of Petitioner, supra note 4, at *2 (describing intermediate scrutiny as
“unworkable”).
68 Id. at *6.
69 Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 389 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
70 Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 931 (9th Cir. 1991).
71 See, e.g., Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 398 n.9 (referring to intermediate scrutiny as
indeterminate); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc., v. City of Phila., 735 F. Supp. 1274, 1303
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (asserting that intermediate scrutiny provides little guidance to courts in
decision making), vacated on other grounds, 945 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1991); Joseph v. City of
Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1335 n.22 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (“[Intermediate scrutiny does]
not provide definite guidance. . . . [T]he consequent risk [is] that the decisions may appear
inconsistent and unprincipled.”); see also Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 604 (1st Cir.
1977) (intermediate scrutiny is “hardly a precise standard”), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978).
72 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[T]hough the intermediate scrutiny test we have applied may not provide a very clear standard
in all instances, our case law does reveal a strong presumption that gender classifications are
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Indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence seems to contradict itself with
regard to the important questions lower courts will have to decide in
addressing gender-based classifications, especially concerning the
amount of evidence needed to demonstrate that a classification is
sufficiently tailored to the asserted interest, whether any amount of
evidence is sufficient to overcome a charge of “stereotyping,” and the
required degree of “fit” between a classification and the ends it is
designed to serve.
A. The Role of Evidence: How Much Is Enough?
The Court’s decisions provide little express guidance with respect
to the amount of evidence a proponent must present to demonstrate
that a gender-based classification is properly tailored.73 In many
cases, the Court requires the proponent to present empirical evidence
to justify its classification. For example, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B, the Court struck down the state’s use of gender-based
peremptory challenges where the state failed to provide sufficient
evidentiary support for its argument that gender was an adequate
predictor of jurors’ attitudes.74 The Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute in Craig v. Boren for the same reason; although the state
presented some statistical evidence that males were more likely than
females to drive while intoxicated, the Court found the evidence
insufficient to justify a statute allowing females to purchase 3.2%
beer at a younger age than males.75
While decisions like Craig and J.E.B. seem to stand for the idea
that litigants must present meaningful evidence to satisfy the tailoring
component of intermediate scrutiny, the Court has nevertheless
upheld gender classifications on several occasions without requiring
any evidence whatsoever to demonstrate the relationship between the
classification and the interest.76 In Kahn v. Shevin,77 for instance, the

invalid.” (citation omitted)); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s announcement of intermediate scrutiny as the standard for
gender classifications).
73 See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“The Court has upheld gender preferences where no statistics were offered, struck down gender
preferences despite the presence of statistics, and also decided cases both ways by relying in
part on statistics.” (internal citations omitted)).
74 511 U.S. 127, 137–38 (observing that Respondent’s reliance on a single study to
support a “quasi-empirical claim” is “[f]ar from . . . an exceptionally persuasive justification for
its gender-based peremptory challenges”).
75 Craig, 429 U.S. at 199.
76 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981) (upholding statute requiring only men
to register for the draft, despite absence of evidence); Craig, 429 U.S. at 203–04 (striking down

3/1/2011 5:33:26 PM

1424

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

Court readily accepted that a property tax exemption for women was
substantially tailored to the government’s interest, despite the absence
of evidence demonstrating that women were any more likely to need
such an economic benefit.78 Similarly, in Schlesinger, the Court
upheld a gender-based classification that allowed women a longer
period to achieve tenure in the Navy without requiring any
evidentiary basis for the government’s policy.79 Instead, the Court
summarily accepted that the classification was based on a
“demonstrable fact,” and not on archaic or overbroad
generalizations.80
B. Does “Stereotype” Trump Sound Evidence?
In addition to the confusion over if and how much evidence is
required to sustain a gender classification, the Court’s precedent
leaves unanswered the question of when, if ever, factually
demonstrated differences between males and females will suffice to
rebut a charge of “stereotyping.” Even where the Court finds the
evidence sufficient to demonstrate a connection between gender and
the interest to be served, the Court in some cases strikes down the
classification as grounded in stereotype, while upholding other
classifications that rely just as heavily on “overbroad generalizations”
about the roles of men and women. For instance, in Weinberger, the
Court agreed that the evidence presented was sufficient to
demonstrate a connection between gender and the need for spousal
survivor benefits.81 Nevertheless, the Weinberger Court struck down a
provision of the Social Security Act that allowed only women to
claim survivors’ benefits, finding that the provision was based on a
“stereotype”—the assumption that most women do not work outside
the home.82 By striking down the classification as grounded in
“stereotype” despite the ample evidence demonstrating the truth of
the assumption, the Court seemed to refute the proposition that a

statute prohibiting men, but not women between ages 18 and 21 from purchasing 3.2% beer
despite presentation of statistics); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (striking
down statute allowing survivors’ benefits for widows but not widowers, despite presentation of
statistics); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 505–10 (1975) (upholding preferential
employment treatment for women military officers despite an absence of evidence).
77 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
78 Id. at 355–56.
79 Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 505–10.
80 Id. at 508.
81 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648.
82 Id. at 645.
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demonstrable basis for a gender distinction could be sufficient to
rebut a charge of stereotyping.83
The Court reached the opposite result in Califano v. Webster,84
where the Court addressed the constitutionality of a tax provision that
allowed women to eliminate more low-earning years from the
calculation of their retirement benefits than it allowed to men.85
Despite the policy’s reliance on the assumption that women typically
earn lower wages than men, the Court found that the policy was not
based on a stereotype, given the demonstrated economic differences
between males and females underlying the policy.86 Through this
analysis, the Court indicated that when a proponent presents sufficient
evidence of the dissimilarities between males and females, a policy
will not fail on “stereotype” grounds. Thus, the Court’s analysis
Webster seems to directly contradict its holding in Weinberger, which
suggested that even demonstrable differences between males and
females would not suffice to justify a classification that relied on
“stereotypes.”
This contradiction leaves lower courts with little guidance on the
proper analysis for classifications that have some demonstrable
support, but also rely on an assumption or stereotypic generalization
about a gender group.87 Commentators have expressly noted that the
Court’s gender discrimination jurisprudence “begs the question of
how exactly to distinguish” policies designed to accommodate
legitimate differences between males and females, and those based
on stereotypic beliefs about each gender.88 This also places litigants
in an even more precarious position, given the lack of certainty over
which definition of “stereotype” the Court will employ. One possible
explanation is that the Court simply employed a different definition of
“stereotype” in Webster and Kahn than it did in Weinberger, enabling
it to reach opposite results in factually similar cases. This possibility
seems particularly likely given the variety of ways the Court has
defined the concept.89
As Part V below illustrates, however, the different outcomes
reached in these cases can easily be explained. When read together,
these cases demonstrate the Court’s application of a more nuanced
Id. at 648.
430 U.S. 313 (1977).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 318–20.
87 See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir. 1993).
88 Juliet A. Williams, Learning Differences: Sex-Role Stereotyping in Single-Sex Public
Education, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 555, 566 (2010).
89 See supra Part II.
83
84
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definition of stereotype than the definition many critics have read into
the Court’s decisions.90 Thus, the Court’s apparent self-contradiction
results not from arbitrary reliance on an amorphous and transient
concept, but rather from the consistent application of principles that
the Court only expressly articulates in its First Amendment
intermediate scrutiny analysis.
C. Proper Level of Scrutiny:
Will Anything Less than “Exceedingly Persuasive” Suffice?
Finally, part of the confusion arising out of the Court’s
preoccupation with the concept of “stereotype” in equal-protection
intermediate scrutiny cases involves a debate over the proper level of
scrutiny courts should apply to gender classifications. While the
Court has not expressly departed from its original articulation of the
intermediate scrutiny standard, confusion abounds with regard to
whether the Court’s requirement of an “exceedingly persuasive
justification”91 in recent cases raised the level of scrutiny applicable
to gender classifications.92
At least one commentator contends that the requirement of an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” has transformed the
intermediate scrutiny standard originally announced in Craig into a
more demanding level of scrutiny than even strict scrutiny.93 Others
observe that this standard requires courts to strike down any
classification that does not function as a “perfect proxy.”94 Under that
formulation, “exceedingly persuasive” could raise intermediate
scrutiny to a higher standard than even strict scrutiny.95 Regardless of
how the standard is articulated, the Court’s decisions “shed[] little
light on the relationship required between the goal and the means of

90 See, e.g., Case, supra note 5, at 1449 (”In the constitutional, just as in the statutory, law
of sex discrimination, ‘stereotype’ has become a term of art by which is simply meant any
imperfect proxy, any overbroad generalization.”).
91 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (applying the exceedingly
persuasive standard); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (same).
92 Skaggs, supra note 23, at 1170–74 (describing how the exceedingly persuasive standard
has generated confusion regarding the level of scrutiny that is truly applied to gender
classifications).
93 See, e.g., id. at 1173 (contending that the Court’s decisions in Hogan, J.E.B., and
Virginia “have transformed [intermediate scrutiny] into a more demanding inquiry”).
94 Case, supra note 5, at 1449–50 (stating that to constitute a “perfect proxy,” a genderbased classification must apply to “either all women or no women, or all men or no men; there
must be zero or a hundred on one side of the sex equation of the other”).
95 Id. at 1453 (“[S]ome rules that might fail the perfect proxy test could nevertheless
survive strict scrutiny.”).
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accomplishing the goal under the ‘exceedingly persuasive
justification’ standard.” 96
As Part V below illustrates that the Court has only had occasion to
require a perfect proxy in cases where the classification serves an
interest unrelated to “inherent differences,” the very reason behind
allowing states more freedom to utilize gender classifications. This
leaves open the possibility that a less exacting form of intermediate
scrutiny may still be appropriate under certain circumstances.
IV. EQUAL-PROTECTION INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS INFORMED
BY FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
As the forgoing discussion illustrates, the idea of stereotype
overwhelms the Court’s intermediate scrutiny equal-protection
jurisprudence. Because of the challenges that arise when dealing with
such an ill-defined and ever-changing concept, the Court seems to
contradict itself with regard to important issues that arise in the
context of gender-based discrimination, including how much
evidence a proponent must provide to satisfy the tailoring
requirement, and whether evidence can ever overcome a charge of
stereotyping.
Fortunately, however, equal protection is not the only context in
which the Court engages in an intermediate scrutiny analysis. Since
1980, the Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny in the First
Amendment context when addressing restrictions on commercial
speech, and has developed a more clearly articulated framework for
conducting an intermediate scrutiny analysis.97 In Central Hudson,
the Court announced a four-part “intermediate scrutiny” test for
restrictions on commercial speech.98 The first prong, which considers
whether the speech is truthful and non-misleading, is traditionally
treated as a threshold inquiry; if this prong is satisfied, the
government must satisfy the remaining three prongs.99 Under the
second prong, courts must consider whether the government has
asserted a “substantial interest.”100 The third and fourth prongs
measure the “fit” between an interest and the means selected to

Skaggs, supra note 23, at 1208.
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (applying a four-step intermediate scrutiny analysis in the context of commercial
speech).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
96
97
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further it.101 More specifically, the third prong considers whether the
speech restriction “directly” advances the government’s interest,
while the fourth prong ensures that the restriction “is not more
extensive than is necessary” in terms of the speech it restricts. 102
As the following section will illustrate, the Court’s equalprotection intermediate scrutiny analyses employ these same
inquiries, though in a less clearly articulated manner. Reframing the
Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence in accordance with the
framework announced in Central Hudson reveals a coherent pattern
in the Court’s reasoning, and may provide lower courts with muchneeded guidance regarding what the Court has found instructive when
evaluating the constitutionality of gender-based classifications.
Because the Court’s First Amendment intermediate scrutiny
analysis has not been overshadowed by references to stereotype, the
Court has more clearly developed and explained the intermediate
scrutiny analysis in that context. For instance, in the First Amendment
context, the Court applies a tailoring analysis that involves two
separate prongs.103 The Court conducts a similar division of its
analysis in the equal-protection context by considering first, whether
a proponent has shown that males and females are dissimilarly
situated with respect to an interest, and second, whether the genderbased policy reaches further than necessary by burdening
“exceptional” members of the gender group.
The Court also explains that in the First Amendment context, a
closer fit between the government’s means and its ends may be
required when the interest to be served is unrelated to the purpose of
affording less protection to commercial speech.104 This provides some
insight into why the Court employs a heightened “exceedingly
persuasive justification” standard for some gender-based
classifications, indicating that the traditional intermediate scrutiny
standard still applies in some circumstances.
As the following subsections will illustrate, the Court’s equalprotection intermediate scrutiny analyses employ these same
inquiries, though in a less clearly articulated manner. Reframing the
Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence in accordance with the
framework announced in Central Hudson may provide lower courts
101 Bd.

of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

102 Central
103 Id.

104 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (plurality opinion of
Stevens, J.) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, n.9) (noting that prohibitions with
objectives unrelated to consumer protection “rarely survive constitutional review”).
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with much-needed guidance regarding what the Court has found
instructive when evaluating the constitutionality of gender-based
classifications.
A. Evidence of Dissimilarity: Equal Protection’s Analogue to the
Third Central Hudson Prong
Under the third Central Hudson prong, the Court requires that a
restriction on commercial speech must “directly advance” the
government interest asserted.105 In this respect, the Court requires the
government to show that it has “carefully calculated”106 the costs and
benefits associated with its infringement on constitutional rights. In
other words, the government must demonstrate that the restriction
will actually further its purpose, and that it will do so in a material
way. This usually requires the government to demonstrate a
connection between the burdened speech and the harm to be
remedied,107 and in many cases the proponent must show that the
speech it restricts contributes more heavily to the problem than forms
of speech that are not affected by the restriction.108 Where commercial
speech is no more responsible for the problem than noncommercial
speech, the Court does not allow the restriction to stand, particularly
where a burden on noncommercial speech would serve the
government’s interest just as much as a burden on commercial
speech.109
Though often buried in a discussion about stereotypes and
generalizations, the Court conducts this same analysis when
determining whether a gender-based classification is sufficiently
tailored under the Equal Protection Clause, by inquiring whether a
policy favoring one gender will advance the asserted interest more
than a gender-neutral policy or a policy favoring the opposite
gender.110 In conducting this analysis, the Court considers whether
105 Central

Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993).
107 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504–05 (describing the required connection
between the burdened speech and the harm that the regulation was meant to address); Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (same).
108 See, e.g., Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 418–19 (noting that a speech regulation is not
reasonable if it affects speech that is less responsible for a governmental problem than other
forms of unregulated speech).
109 See id. (discussing the necessary degree of fit between the policy and the government’s
interest to pass constitutional muster).
110 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282 (1979) (“Progress toward fulfilling such a
purpose would not be hampered, and it would cost the State nothing more, if it were to treat men
and women equally by making alimony burdens independent of sex.”); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (“[T]he gender-based distinction is gratuitous; without it,
106 City
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males and females are dissimilarly situated with respect to the
government’s asserted interest.111 In particular, the Court analyzes
whether the burdened gender contributes to the alleged harm in a
greater degree, or whether the favored gender feels the negative
impact of that harm to a greater degree.112
As discussed in Part III, the Court seems to have equivocated over
what, if any amount of evidence will suffice to demonstrate that
males and females are dissimilarly situated. Yet the Court’s treatment
of this question is consistent with the analysis it conducts in the First
Amendment context. While the Court has never expressly stated what
evidence the proponent of a commercial speech restriction must
present to establish the requisite connection under this prong,
commentators have observed that the Court employs a sort of “sliding
scale” analysis.113 Under this approach, the amount of evidence
required varies depending on the obviousness of the connection
between the burdened speech and the harm to be addressed. Where
the connection is a matter of “common sense,” the Court frequently
upholds restrictions without considering the evidence, if any,
presented by the government in support of its contention.114 But when
the asserted connection between commercial speech and a particular
social harm requires some explanation, the Court strikes down
restrictions where the government has failed to present empirical or
anecdotal evidence in support of its position.115

the statutory scheme would only provide benefits to those men who are in fact similarly situated
to the women the statute aids.”).
111 See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001) (noting that fathers and
mothers are not similarly situated); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S.
464, 471 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting that adolescent boys and girls are dissimilarly
situated in regard to the risks associated with teenage pregnancy).
112 See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471–72 (finding males and females to be dissimilarly
situated with regard to the government’s interest in preventing rape and teenage pregnancy; only
males can cause the harms associated with rape and unintended pregnancy, while females suffer
disproportionately from the effects).
113 Shannon M. Hinegardner, Note, Abrogating the Supreme Court’s De Facto Rational
Basis Standard for Commercial Speech: A Survey and Proposed Revision of the Third Central
Hudson Prong, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 523, 545 (2009).
114 See id. (noting that defenders of logical speech restrictions only need to satisfy lower
standards of proof); see also Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (accepting
that advertisements for certain brands of cigarettes increase consumers’ consumption of those
brands without requiring any empirical evidence to demonstrate a connection); Metromedia, Inc.
v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (readily accepting that commercial billboards designed
to catch drivers’ attention pose a danger to highway safety).
115 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S 484, 504 (1996) (striking down
a ban on alcohol price advertisements in the absence of any evidence that price advertisements
contributed to greater consumption; connection between speech and harm was not a matter of
common sense).
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In many of the decisions upholding classifications without any
consideration of evidence, the proffered dissimilarity is based on what
the Court perceives to be an obvious distinction between males and
females. Since its articulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard,
the Court consistently treats only differences grounded in biology as
matters of “common sense.”116 Moreover, many of the Court’s
decisions upholding classifications without any consideration of
evidence involve a biological dissimilarity related to what is perhaps
the most obvious biological distinction between males and females:
the ability to become pregnant and bear children.117
In contrast, in cases where Court required a more detailed showing
of the connection between gender and the interest the state seeks to
advance, the proffered distinctions were unrelated in any way to
biological or physiological differences.118 Accordingly, many of the
gender classifications failed based on a lack of evidence were
grounded in a “dissimilarity” unrelated to physiological
differences.119 Rather than equivocating with regard to the amount of
evidence a proponent must provide in defending its gender-based
classification, the Court has engaged in a consistent pattern of
116 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63 (noting that fathers and mothers are not similarly
situated); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471 (noting that adolescent boys and girls are dissimilarly
situated in regard to the risks associated with teenage pregnancy). The Court has also at least
one other dissimilarity grounded in law to be a matter of common sense. See Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75 (1981) (accepting, without any evidence, that males and females are
dissimilarly situated with respect to the government’s interest in using a draft to gather combatready troops, because federal law excludes women from combat). In its pre-intermediate
scrutiny jurisprudence, the Court also accepted social and economic differences between males
and females as “obvious,” when it upheld the gender-based distinctions in Kahn and Schlesinger
without any evidentiary showing that males and females were in fact dissimilarly situated with
respect to the asserted interests in providing for needy spouses or compensating for a lack of
opportunities for military career advancement. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508
(1975) (“[T]he different treatment of men and women naval officers . . . reflects, not archaic and
overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and female line officers
in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service.”);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974) (“There can be no dispute that the financial
difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or any other State exceed those facing the
man.”).
117 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63 (noting that fathers and mothers are not similarly
situated); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471 (noting that adolescent boys and girls are dissimilarly
situated in regard to the risks associated with teenage pregnancy)
118 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137–38 (1994) (difference
related to potential for bias against criminal defendant); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
619 (1984) (purported difference related to opinions and preferred topics of discussion); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (difference related to drunk driving).
119 See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (invalidating use of gender as a basis for preemptory
challenges to jurors); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612 (upholding state law that forbid private groups
from discriminating on the basis of gender); Craig, 429 U.S. at 192 (striking down statute
creating different minimum ages for males and females to buy 3.2 percent alcohol content beer).
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analysis that takes into account the type of dissimilarity the proponent
relies on. When a distinction between genders is based on an
observable fact, the distinction requires no evidentiary support. For
instance, the Court required no evidence in Michael M. and Nguyen
because the government relied on observable biological differences
between males and females.120 Similarly, the Court required no
evidence in Rostker and Schlesinger, where the alleged dissimilarities
were based on observable factors: federal laws expressly excluding
women from combat. Thus, when dissimilarity is grounded in factors
that courts can independently verify, courts can easily evaluate
whether a preference for one gender will advance the government’s
interest more effectively than a neutral policy. Conversely, when a
dissimilarity is less obvious, proponents of gender-based
classifications must be prepared to demonstrate an evidentiary basis
for any claims that males and females are dissimilarly situated. As the
Court’s decisions indicate, such evidence is essential to a court’s
ability to determine whether the classification is in fact tailored to the
government’s interest, or whether the government has simply
invented a “post hoc” explanation for a constitutionally impermissible
policy.121
B. Burden on Exceptional Members: Equal Protection’s Analogue to
the Fourth Central Hudson Prong
While the analogy between the third Central Hudson prong and
the Court’s analysis of whether males and females are “dissimilarly
situated” may explain the Court’s equivocation over the amount of
evidence required to sustain a gender-based classification as
sufficiently tailored, it does not explain why the Court strikes down
gender classifications it deems to be based on “stereotypes” despite
its recognition of a strong factual and evidentiary basis for a
distinction.122
The answer becomes clear when the Court’s decisions are viewed
once again through the lens of Central Hudson. Like the Central
Hudson fit test, which is comprised of the third and fourth prongs,123
the equal-protection tailoring analysis consists of two components. In
addition to considering whether the genders are sufficiently
120 Nguyen,

533 U.S. at 68; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471.
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (justifications cannot
be invented post hoc or in response to litigation).
122 See supra Part III.
123 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
121 See
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dissimilar, such that preferring one gender to the other will
substantially advance the government’s interest in solving or
preventing a social problem, the Court also incorporates a concern for
“exceptional” members of a gender group into its tailoring analysis.124
This concern for members who either do not contribute to or who are
not affected by the targeted problem in the same way as other
members of their gender group reflects the analysis the Court
conducts under the fourth Central Hudson prong, which considers
whether a restriction burdens more speech than necessary to serve the
state’s interest.125
This explains the result in cases like Weinberger and Goldfarb;
despite the sufficiency of the evidence presented to satisfy the equalprotection equivalent of the third Central Hudson prong (dissimilarly
situated with respect to an interest) the statute’s failure to pass
constitutional muster can be attributed to its overbreadth. In striking
down the statutes at issue in both Weinberger and Goldfarb, the Court
criticized the government’s reliance on the “overbroad
generalizations” that male workers’ earnings are more vital to the
support of their families than the earnings of similarly situated
females,126 or that widows are more “needy” than widowers.127 It
seems at first glance that because these cases hinged on “stereotype,”
the strength of the evidence presented made no difference to the
Court. Further review reveals, however, that the Court’s finding of a
“stereotype” in those cases was based on the same overbreadth
analysis it employs under the fourth Central Hudson prong.
Specifically, the Court struck down the classifications because they
burdened more members of a gender group than necessary to achieve
the government’s interest.
Tellingly, in striking down the provision in Weinberger as
reflective of a “stereotype,” the Court observed that it
“denigrat[ed] . . . the efforts of women who do work and whose
earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.”128 Thus,
the Court acknowledged that while most men and women are
124 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 (1996) (striking down VMI’s
male-only admissions policy based on the lower courts’ finding that some women could benefit
from VMI’s adversative method).
125 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
126 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977).
127 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 n.19 (1975) (“[I]f the society’s aim is to
further a socially desirable purpose . . . it should tailor any subsidy directly to the end desired,
not indirectly and unequally by helping widows with dependent children and ignoring widowers
in the same plight.”).
128 Id. at 645.
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dissimilarly situated with respect to the government’s interest in
providing for widow’s benefits, the statute’s fatal flaw was its
disadvantage to exceptional women. Similarly, in Califano v.
Goldfarb, the Court struck down a provision of the Social Security
Act that denied many female wage earners the opportunity to provide
for their families through social security old age benefits.129 Despite
the overwhelming evidence that most primary wage earners were in
fact male, the Court found it persuasive that the provision impacted
those females who fell outside the gender norm, and were in fact the
primary wage earners for their families.130 The Court echoed this
same sentiment in Virginia, when it struck down VMI’s male-only
admissions policy.131 Despite its observation that VMI’s educational
technique would not be suitable for most women, the Court could not
overlook the policy’s impact on exceptional women.132 Writing for
the majority, Justice Ginsberg noted that if even one woman could
benefit from VMI’s adversative teaching method, VMI’s genderbased policy could not pass intermediate scrutiny.133
These decisions indicate that in conducting a tailoring analysis, the
Court is not concerned with whether more individuals than necessary
are merely affected by the classification, but rather whether more
individuals than necessary are burdened by the classification. This
helps to explain why the Court sustained the gender preferences in
cases like Kahn and Webster, despite the undoubtedly overbroad
impact of the provisions at issue. Indeed, the tax exemption in Kahn
or the benefits at issue in Webster undoubtedly benefitted more
women than necessary to serve the government’s interest, as it would
be difficult to argue that every woman who received the property tax
deduction in Kahn suffered from the economic disadvantages the state
sought to address. In this respect, the policies were no different than
the “overbroad” policies struck down in Goldfarb and Weinberger. In
all four cases, the policies extended to “exceptional” members of the
gender group at issue. The difference in outcome, however, lies in the
direction of the impact. In Goldfarb and Weinberger, the Court found
that the policies served to disadvantage exceptional women, while the
policies in Kahn and Webster provided a benefit to all women,
129 Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 199 (holding that the provision violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment).
130 Id. at 206.
131 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546 (1996) (holding that Virginia did not meet
the necessary exceedingly persuasive justification needed for any gender-based classification).
132 Id. at 542 (observing that Virginia could not “constitutionally deny to women who have
the will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords”).
133 Id. at 546.
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including those exceptional women who were unaffected by the
problem the government sought to remedy. Thus, an impact on
exceptional members of a gender group may not always prove fatal to
a gender classification, so long as the impact is advantageous, or at
least neutral.
When framed in this way, the Court’s definition of “stereotype” is
far narrower than its common usage might suggest.134 Rather than
referring to any gender-based assumption that does not apply to all
members of a group,135 the Court uses the concept of “stereotype”
only to strike down policies that impose a burden on those members
of the group to whom the generalization does not apply, and thus are
not “dissimilarly” situated from members of the opposite gender.
C. Exceedingly Persuasive and Perfect Proxy:
Equal Protection’s “Special Care”
While the application of Central Hudson’s third and fourth prongs
may clear up the some confusion over the Court’s treatment of
evidence and the relationship between evidence and stereotypes, the
remaining question concerns whether the Court’s requirement of an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” in certain equal-protection
cases creates a higher degree of scrutiny, and whether such a standard
must apply to all gender-based classifications.136
The answer to this question lies in the relationship of the second
Central Hudson prong to the third and fourth prongs. Specifically,
where the government asserts an interest under the second prong that
is unrelated to preventing a commercial harm, the Court has observed
that the reasons for affording a lower level of scrutiny disappear.137
This is because the purpose of applying a lower level of scrutiny to
restrictions on commercial speech is to allow for greater protection
against the harm that commercial speech can potentially cause to
consumers.138 When the potential for such harm is not present, the
134 See

Case, supra note 5, at 1449 (broadly defining stereotype).
at 1450.
136 See Skaggs, supra note 23, at 1173 (discussing the various interpretations of the
“exceedingly persuasive justification” standard).
137 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501–03 (1996) (plurality
opinion of Stevens, J.) (observing that “there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous
review that the First Amendment generally demands” where a government restriction on
commercial speech is unrelated to commercial harm).
138 The Court has characterized “commercial harm” as the detrimental effects that result
when speech deprives consumers of a fair bargaining process by either restricting their ability to
make contractual choices, or by misleading them about the relative costs and benefits of a
proposed transaction. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (“[C]ommercial harm” involves
infringement on “a fair bargaining process.”); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620
135 Id.
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Court cautions that commercial-speech restrictions must be reviewed
with “special care” to ensure a closer fit between the government’s
interest and the means selected to achieve them.139 This higher degree
of scrutiny is parallel to the heightened standard the Court created in
the equal-protection context by requiring an “exceedingly persuasive”
justification in many of its cases.140 More importantly, however, the
survival of a less exacting form of intermediate scrutiny in the First
Amendment context demonstrates that the Court still employs a
standard less demanding than “exceedingly persuasive” in equalprotection cases where the interest asserted relates to the purpose of
intermediate scrutiny.
In the equal-protection context, the Court reasoned that purpose of
intermediate scrutiny is to account for “inherent differences” between
the genders.141 In this respect, equal-protection intermediate scrutiny
affords government actors more leeway in classifying on the basis of
gender, just as First Amendment intermediate scrutiny allows more
leeway in restricting commercial speech. In both contexts,
intermediate scrutiny accounts for unique circumstances where
government infringement on constitutional rights may be justified
based on some countervailing need or interest.
Thus, where a gender classification is designed to serve an interest
that is unrelated to addressing inherent differences, it logically
follows that the Court should employ a more “exacting” review of the
fit between the interest and the ends designed to serve it. It is not
surprising, then, that in a majority of the cases where the Court struck
down a classification that burdened exceptional members, the asserted

(1995) (finding a potential for commercial harm based on conclusion that attorney solicitations
of accident were likely to unfairly coerce consumers during a vulnerable and highly emotional
time).
139 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv.
Comm’n, 447, 477 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)). Importantly, the Court has never suggested that a
heightened standard should apply in the First Amendment context where the asserted interest is
related to preventing commercial harms. See, e.g., Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 620 (finding an interest
related to preventing commercial harm to consumers).
140 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (holding that the reason
for the gender discrimination must be “exceedingly persuasive”); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that the exceedingly persuasive justification burden
is met “only by showing at least that the classification serves ‘important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.’” (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142, 150 (1980))).
141 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208 (1976) (describing the reason for viewing gender
classifications with less scrutiny than racial classifications); see also Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533
(“‘Inherent differences’ between men and women . . . remain cause for celebration . . . ”).
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government interest was in fact unrelated to inherent differences
between males and females.142 Therefore, when an interest is related
to inherent differences, it follows that the Court should not require as
perfect a fit between the means and the ends, and would likely
tolerate a modest burden on some exceptional members.
While the Court has not had occasion to expressly decide whether
a less-perfect proxy would be permissible when a classification is
related to inherent differences, its First Amendment jurisprudence
indicates that a burden on some “exceptional members” of the gender
group would not prove fatal to the classification. Additionally, it is no
coincidence that the Court has never had an opportunity to
demonstrate this principle, as the requirement of perfect fit has always
been met in cases where the government interest addresses an
“inherent difference.” This is because the only “inherent differences”
the Court expressly recognized are those related to the reproductive
functions of males and females, a characteristic for which gender is
necessarily a perfect proxy.143 Thus, the biologically based policies in
cases like Nguyen and Michael M did not burden exceptional
members, because no such members existed.
Still, this is not to say that a scenario could never arise where a
classification based on biological factors such as brain chemistry or
hormones does burden exceptional members. The Court never
foreclosed the possibility that “inherent differences” may refer to
differences that, while grounded in biological factors, are unrelated to
reproduction. For instance, a growing body of research indicates that
males and females are physiologically different with respect to brain
functioning, brain chemistry, and hormonal levels, such that the
different learning styles and methods of reasoning often attributed to
each gender may in fact be grounded in measured physiological
differences.144 One potential problem with relying on neurological
and hormonal differences to justify gender-based classifications is the
difficulty inherent in line drawing. Unlike reproductive capabilities,
142 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 518 (asserting interest in providing diverse educational
opportunities); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 654 (1975) (asserting interest in
providing for families upon the death of a wage-earner).
143 See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 54 (2001) (upholding a law that requires
legitimization of paternity before a child born outside the United States whose father is a citizen
may gain citizenship); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 465
(1981) (upholding California’s statutory rape law, relying in part on the fact that the law aimed
to protect illegitimate teenage pregnancies); see also Case, supra note 5, at 1449 (defining
“perfect proxy”).
144 Williams, supra note 88, at 571. Such differences are often cited in support of singlesex education programs. Id.
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which necessarily place individuals into one category or another,
hormonal and neurological characteristics may not always create such
a clear division. In this respect, a classification based on nonreproductive biological differences could have greater potential to
affect and possibly burden those “exceptional” males and females
who do not fall on the same side of the line as the majority of their
gender group. Still, the Court has never foreclosed the possibility, and
its First Amendment jurisprudence even supports the possibility that
the Court would sustain a classification despite any burden imposed
on exceptional members where the interest asserted relates to
“inherent differences” between males and females.
In this respect, the role of biology in the intermediate scrutiny
analysis is two-fold. First, described in Section III of this Comment,
when an asserted dissimilarity between males and females is
grounded in biology, the Court does not require that the proponents of
a gender-based classification present any outside evidence of that
dissimilarity. Rather, the Court readily accepts that men and women
are dissimilarly situated in those cases. Second, when the proponent
asserts an interest that addresses biological differences between males
and females, the Court may tolerate a policy that burdens exceptional
members of a gender group.
Additionally, depending on the outcome of a case currently under
the Court’s consideration,145 biological differences may soon be the
only permissible basis for a gender-based classification. Indeed, the
Court has not upheld a gender-based classification based on nonbiological factors since 1981.146 In United States v. Flores-Villar,147
the petitioner challenged an immigration statute, which provides that
citizen fathers who have not lived in the United States for at least five
years after the age of fourteen are prohibited from transmitting
citizenship to their illegitimate children born abroad.148 Neither the
alleged interest in preventing statelessness nor the alleged
dissimilarity between males and females is grounded in biology; the
Court granted certiorari to determine whether, as the petitioner

145 United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct
1878 (2010).
146 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981) (finding it constitutional to register only
men for the draft because women are excluded from combat, men and women were dissimilarly
situated with respect to the government’s interest in providing combat-ready troops during
wartime).
147 536 F.3d 990.
148 Id.
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alleges, a gender-based classification must be based on biological
factors.149
If the Court in Flores-Villar finds in the petitioner’s favor, it will
signal to lower courts and litigants that differences that are not
grounded in biological factors, such as the socioeconomic differences
recognized in the Court’s early intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence,150
are no longer permissible grounds for distinguishing between males
and females. But, until the Court indicates that nonbiological
differences are no longer a permissible basis for distinguishing based
on gender, nonbiological differences may suffice, so long as the
proponent can demonstrate through evidence that males and females
are dissimilarly situated, and that the classification does not impose a
burden on “exceptional” members of a gender group.
V. APPLICATION: GENDER-BASED ADMISSIONS
POLICIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
As the following discussion illustrates, the Central Hudson test for
intermediate scrutiny may inform the equal-protection equivalent in a
way that gives courts and litigants addressing gender-based
admissions policies a more manageable framework for applying
intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the following sections discuss how courts
and litigants can effectively address challenges to such policies in a
manner that is both effective and consistent with the Supreme Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence.
Based on the concerns that both college admissions administrators
and outside observers raise regarding the negative effects of a
predominantly female student body, proponents of gender-based
admissions policies may assert that the classification serves the
following “important interests”: (1) preserving the university’s ability
to attract qualified applicants, and (2) minimizing the opportunity for
a “hookup” culture to develop on campus.151 When realigned within
the Central Hudson framework, the Court’s equal-protection
149 Id. The Court heard oral arguments in November 2010, but has not yet rendered a
decision. Flores-Villar v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG (May 11, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.
com/case-files/cases/flores-villar-v-united-states/.
150 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (holding that a law giving women
more time than men to gain a promotion before mandatory discharge was constitutional because
female officers do not have the opportunities for advancement than male officers have); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (holding that a tax law granting widows an annual $500 tax
exemption was constitutional because a woman faces a greater financial burden when she loses
her husband than when a man loses his wife).
151 See supra Part I (discussing concerns regarding the effects of the increasingly female
population on campuses).
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jurisprudence demonstrates that courts must consider the following
when evaluating whether gender-based admissions policies are
substantially tailored to either interest: (1) whether an admissions
policy favoring males will serve the government’s interest to a greater
degree than a gender-neutral policy or a policy favoring females; and
(2) whether the classification burdens “exceptional” females.
Based on the Supreme Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence as
reframed under Central Hudson’s framework, courts determining
whether an admissions policy favoring males will further the
government’s interest to a greater degree than a gender-neutral or
female-favoring policy, will consider whether males either
(1) contribute to the problem in greater proportion, or (2) are affected
by the problem to a greater degree than females.152 Proponents of
gender-based policies may contend that males contribute to the
problems associated with a hookup culture in greater proportion than
females, and are therefore dissimilarly situated. Proponents may also
argue that because females contribute to the decline in a university’s
appeal to applicants to a greater degree than males, females are
dissimilarly situated from males with respect to that interest.
In its decisions evaluating dissimilar situation, the Court has only
upheld classifications that benefit the gender that is more negatively
affected by a problem.153 Similarly, the Court has only upheld policies
imposing a burden on the gender that contributes to a problem to a
greater degree.154 Never has the Court upheld a policy that burdens
members of the gender group more severely affected by the problem
the policy seeks to remedy. This likely forecloses universities from
relying on precedent like Michael M and Nguyen to contend that
males and females are dissimilarly situated. Because males contribute
to the problems associated with a hookup culture, a policy favoring
the gender that allegedly contributes to a problem would be
anomalous under intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence. Moreover, to
further burden members of the gender group more severely affected
by a problem runs counter to the Court’s insistence that “inherent
152 See

supra Part V.
e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(upholding a statute which afforded females greater protection from statutory rape, a problem
that affects females more than males); Schlesinger, 419 U.S. 498 (upholding a policy that
benefitted for female Navy officers where the problem associated with a lack of advancement
opportunity for women in the Navy necessarily affected women more than men).
154 Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (noting that problems involving lack of
proof of parentage are more attributable to male than female parents); Michael M., 450 U.S. at
475 (finding that the statute provides an additional deterrent for men who do not have the
significant deterrents to sexual intercourse as females).
153 See,
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differences” cannot be use “for denigration of the members of either
sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”155
Accordingly, the best argument for a university seeking to
establish that males and females are dissimilarly situated with respect
to both interests may be that female students, by their very presence
on campus, are in fact the group with contributes to the harm(s) the
university seeks to avoid. While this contention seems to unfairly
fault females for a phenomenon that is outside their individual
control, the Court endorsed a very similar contention in Nguyen. By
acknowledging that the males contribute more than females to the
problem of inconclusive proof of parentage, the Court seemed
unconcerned with the fact that a male’s inability to conclusively
prove parentage by his presence at birth falls outside his control.
Still, an argument that females’ presence on a college campus
somehow changes the nature of the university as an institution runs
dangerously close to the types of contentions the Court rejected in
cases like Virginia and Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees.156 In those cases, the
proponents of male-only policies contended that the admission of
women would somehow “alter” the nature of the institution; in both
instances, the Court struck the classification down as insufficiently
tailored because of their basis in “stereotypes” about “the way women
are.”157 As the foregoing analysis reveals, the more persuasive factors
in those cases were the absence of evidence or common
sense/inherent differences demonstrating the connection between
femaleness and the overall nature of an institution, and the burden
imposed on exceptional women where the basis for the policy was not
grounded in an inherent difference.
Thus, if proponents of gender-based admissions policies could
empirically demonstrate that males and females are dissimilarly
situated in terms of their impact on a campus culture—or, in other
words, that no male’s presence on campus would contribute to an
environment where men are “in demand”158—then a court might be
more willing to accept that a preference for males will in fact further
an interest in preventing a hookup culture. Similarly, if a proponent
could successfully demonstrate through evidence that no male’s
155 United

States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
U.S. 609 (1984).
157 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542 (rejecting “[t]he notion that admission of women would
downgrade VMI’s stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school”);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625 (rejecting Jaycees’ claim that admitting women to meetings would
change the nature of the discussions held at meetings).
158 See Case, supra note 5, at 1449–50 (defining “perfect proxy”).
156 468
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presence on campus would reduce the school’s ability to attract the
most qualified applicants, this may be sufficient to establish that
males and females are dissimilarly situated with respect to the
proponent’s interest.159
As discussed above, evidence of dissimilarity with respect to an
interest may be insufficient to establish that a gender-based
classification is sufficiently tailored if a gender-based admissions
policy burdens “exceptional” females. In the context of the interests a
university is most likely to assert, such exceptional women would
include those, if any, whose presence on campus could not
(1) contribute to the creation of a social culture where men are in
demand, or (2) inhibit the university’s ability to attract applicants.160
When the interest is framed as avoiding a social culture where
males are in demand, the classification arguably imposes a burden on
“exceptional” women who could not, by virtue of their sexual
orientation, contribute to a culture where males are in demand.161
While an attraction to males may serve as a more perfect proxy than
gender, it would be near impossible (and legally objectionable)162 for
a university to accurately identify and grant preference to those
women in the application process. Thus, a burden on exceptional
members seems unavoidable when the interest centers on preserving
the social environment.
Still, courts could accept that an interest in preventing a hookup
culture addresses “inherent differences” between males and females,
particularly if a proponent can demonstrate that biological factors,
such as hormones and brain chemistry, are responsible for driving the
behavior that occurs when one gender is in demand. In that case, the
Court’s First Amendment precedent supports, and its equal-protection
cases do not foreclose, the possibility that a burden on exceptional
members may not be fatal to a gender-based classification. Still,
because the Court has yet to recognize an “inherent difference”
unrelated to reproductive functions, questions remain over whether
159 In addition to the challenges necessarily associated with demonstrating such a
contention, it would be difficult to argue that a dissimilarity based on the impact that
individual’s presence has on the attractiveness of a university to other applicants falls within any
of the categories of dissimilarities that the Court has previously recognized.
160 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that the state must demonstrate
that preference for women would inhibit the state’s ability to achieve its goals).
161 This does not assume that all women interested in men would in fact participate in a
hookup culture. It only assumes that such women, by altering the gender ratio on campus, would
foster an environment more conducive to such a culture by placing males in the minority.
162 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s Amendment
Two because it discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation).
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the different ways in which males and females both contribute to and
are affected by a hookup culture fall within the Court’s definition of
“inherent differences.” In one respect, courts could potentially find
that gender-based admissions policies address the same type of
inherent differences the Court has previously recognized.
Alternatively, proponents may push courts to recognize that “inherent
differences” encompass more than just reproductive differences, such
that differences grounded in hormones and brain chemistry may
suffice as evidence that males and females are dissimilarly situated.163
Because an interest in attracting applicants is less easily framed as
addressing “inherent” difference between males and females, courts
evaluating such policies may very well require a “perfect proxy.” A
plausible argument exists that there would be no “exceptional”
women, particularly if courts accept that all females, by their very
admittance, pose a threat to the university’s interest in attracting
future applicants. In this respect, gender would serve as a perfect
proxy for impact on a school’s attractiveness to applicants. Thus,
despite serving an interest unrelated to biological or inherent
differences, a classification designed to preserve a university’s ability
to attract applicants could nevertheless satisfy equal-protection
intermediate scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
One of the major difficulties facing lower courts and litigants in
challenges to gender-based policies is the muddled state of genderdiscrimination jurisprudence.164 As this Comment demonstrates, the
Supreme Court’s gender-discrimination jurisprudence may be less
murky than it seems at a surface level; the Court’s commercial-speech
decisions provide insight into the Court’s analysis in reaching what
appear to be contradictory decisions.
Just as the Court considers whether a commercial-speech
restriction will directly and materially advance the government’s
interest, it analyzes whether, based on a dissimilarity between males
and females, a gender-based classification will further the
government’s interest to a greater degree than a gender-neutral policy.
While the Court seems to contradict itself with regard to the amount
of evidence the proponent of a gender-based classification must
163 See Williams, supra note 88, at 571 (discussing the emerging statistical evidence that
hormones and brain physiology account for the differences between male and female learning
and thinking patterns).
164 Kingsbury, supra note 1.
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present, this apparent contradiction can easily explained by the sliding
scale analysis the Court has employed in the First Amendment
context; the more “common sense” (i.e., biologically based) a
dissimilarity, the less evidence the Court requires the proponent to
present in demonstrating that its classification is substantially tailored.
Additionally, the Court’s apparent equivocation over the
relationship between stereotype and evidence can be explained by
analogy to the fourth Central Hudson prong’s overbreadth analysis.
Rather than striking down any gender-based classification that
generally affects more members of a gender group than is necessary
to serve an interest, the Court only strikes down those classifications
imposing a burden on exceptional members, just as it does when only
considering whether a speech restriction burdens more speech than
necessary under the fourth Central Hudson prong.
Finally, while the Court’s requirement of an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” in recent equal-protection cases indicates that
a heightened degree of scrutiny applies to all gender-based
classifications, its First Amendment cases instruct that the proponent
need not meet this higher burden when the asserted interest is
unrelated to the justification for applying intermediate scrutiny in the
first place. Consequently, a less-exacting version of intermediate
scrutiny is still applicable to classifications serving an interest related
to “inherent differences” between males and females. Because neither
the Court’s equal-protection or First Amendment decisions under
intermediate scrutiny offer any insight into what the Court views as
“inherent differences,” the lingering question is whether a less-thanperfect proxy could ever be acceptable when the policy addresses
biological differences unrelated to pregnancy and childbearing. Thus,
while analogizing the Court’s equal-protection decisions to its First
Amendment intermediate scrutiny framework may go a long way in
guiding lower courts and litigants, only the Court itself can clarify
this point. In the event that an equal-protection challenge to genderbased admissions policy reaches the Court, such a case would provide
the Court with the perfect opportunity to provide the final bit of
guidance necessary to place its equal-protection intermediate scrutiny
jurisprudence back on solid ground.
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